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Abstract We present the results of an experiment measuring the impact of low group
status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrimination. Subjects
interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets
where they can trade group membership. Low status and minority subjects have low
morale: that is, they comparatively dislike being low status and being minority sub-
jects. Group discrimination against low status and minority subjects is unchanged.
However, low status subjects are deferential to high status subjects in terms of com-
paratively higher trust, and minority subjects are deferential to majority subjects in
terms of comparatively higher trustworthiness.
Keywords Groups · Trust games · Deference · Discrimination · Status · Group size
JEL Classification C72 · C91 · Z13
1 Introduction
In recent years there has been an increasing attention to the importance of groups
in understanding and explaining social capital, cooperation and well-being. For ex-
ample, there is some evidence that membership in a group can affect subjects’ be-
havior in prisoner’s dilemma and battle of the sexes games (Charness et al. 2007;
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Goette et al. 2006), in the public goods game (e.g., Tan and Bolle 2007), in bargain-
ing settings (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 2002; Zizzo 2003), two person sequen-
tial games (Chen and Li 2009), trust games (Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo 2009) and
in coordination games (Chen and Chen 2010). Intergroup bias forms naturally al-
ready with children (e.g., Sherif 1967; Files et al. 2010), and group identification has
been hypothesized to be a source of individual well-being (e.g., Akerlof and Kran-
ton 2002); indeed, there is some neurobiological evidence that being a member of a
group produces an endorphin rush (see Dunbar 2006).
The starting point of this paper is that, almost pervasively, groups come in differ-
ent relative sizes and/or social status. When there is discussion of ethnic conflict, for
example, this is often phrased along the lines of majorities and minorities.1 Similarly,
perceptions of different social status are often perceived to accompany members of
different groups:2 for example, within an organization, members of a given team or of
an ‘old boys and/or girls network’ being given status that other teams or those who are
not in the elite network within the same organization do not have; or, more generally,
Ivy League graduates vs. graduates from a local community college; or members of
different castes in the traditional Hindu societal structure (BBC 2007). In some cases
majority and minority status coincide with high and low status respectively: for ex-
ample, domestic nationals versus perceived foreigners that are deemed of low status
(e.g., Costello and Hodson 2011). Recent policy measures in both western Europe
and United States have come under scrutiny for the extent to which they may hide,
or institutionalize, intergroup discrimination by domestic nationals with respect to
immigrant minorities made by foreign nationals.3 In Japan, the segregation between
the ordinary citizens who belonged to four recognized ranks (samurai warriors; farm-
ers; artisans and trade people) and the minority outsiders were institutionalized in the
sixteenth century. The discrimination against the outcast group still exists nowadays
(Sugimoto 2003).
A key step in trying to understand the implications of groups for economies and
organizations is then to look at how changing relative group size and/or changing
group status affects trust and trustworthiness: this is what we do in this paper. So-
cial identity theory would predict that subjects’ feelings of self-worth derive from
1For example, Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in Burundi and Rwanda; Sinhalese majority and Tamil
minority in Sri Lanka; the French majority and Roma minority in France; the national ethnic majority and
the Jewish minority at various times of European history, such as 16th century Spain or Nazi Germany; the
black majority and white minority in South Africa at the time of apartheid.
2Psychological theories that have tried to explain hierarchical group relationships are social identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner 2001), where lower status groups contribute less to individual social identity therefore
leading to differential attitudes; social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), which posits that low
status group exhibit less ingroup bias insofar as they see the status differential as legitimate; and system
justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994), in which low status subjects are seen as internalizing beliefs
that serve to maintain the status quo, even when detrimental to themselves.
3Three recent examples are the new controversial anti-immigration policy in Arizona, which is being
legally challenged by the Obama administration (Montopoli 2010); the recent waves of anti-Roma raids in
France (Brooks 2010); and the curious way in which the U.K. the increase in high fee paying international
student numbers is seen as a problem requiring a tightening in immigration policy (Mulholland 2010), at a
time in which heavy public funding cuts and broader economic fragility should imply a greater rather than
lower need for the income that these students bring.
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being member of a group; low status group membership (or minority group mem-
bership insofar as it is perceived as low status) may be associated to lower self-
evaluation (and hence psychological value) and to coping strategies that may include
deferential behavior towards the high status (or majority) group (e.g. Turner 1975;
Tajfel and Turner 2001). There is suggestive evidence that this is the case (e.g., Milner
1975), but equally perceptions of minorities as low status may change as minorities
develop better self-identities, e.g. with African Americans (Harris and Brown 1971),
making interpretation difficult. In empirical work respectively with U.S. and Indian
data, Alesina et al. (1999) and Banerjee et al. (2005) show that social fragmentation
can be negative for public good provision. One specific problem of interpretation is
the extent to which though there is a causal link between social fragmentation and
social welfare. There is also a question of how, for specific natural groups, results
may depend on specific sets of stereotypes associated to the natural groups rather
than apparent inter-group preferences, as Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) find in rela-
tion to the separation between Ashkenazic Jews and Eastern Jews (though with males
only).4 They may also depend on group-specific social norms (Berger et al. 2011)
and preferences (Fehr et al. 2008). An experiment with artificial groups can then be
ideally placed to identify the causal effect of having minority and low status groups
independently of looking at the effect of the stereotypes, social norms and preferences
associated to specific natural groups.
We do so such an experiment in the context of trust games, which is a natural
stylized modeling setup for the operation of social capital. For example, in an orga-
nizational context, and as noted by Johnson and Mislin (2008), trust is recognized
to raise efficiency by lower monitoring costs and turnover and by increasing uncom-
pensated positive behavior from employees. These are normally seen as working in
the direction of what Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009; HHZ in what follows) label
positive discrimination: i.e. greater trust and trustworthiness than what would be ex-
pected if there were no partitions of agents into groups.5 There could also however
be what HHZ label negative discrimination: i.e. lower trust and trustworthiness than
what would be expected if there were no partitions of agents into groups. HHZ found
evidence of negative discrimination in their trust game experiment, which suggests
that the relationship between groups and social capital may be more complex than
usually posited, at least in trust settings.6
4Goette et al. (2006, 2012) find evidence of discrimination in a field experiment with Swiss Army platoons,
but do not look at issues of minority groups of status.
5One can always label the set of all subjects as a group, and so in a sense one could rephrase this as
stating that the introduction of further sub-groups would lead to further trust and trustworthiness within
the sub-group relative to the baseline in which no sub-group would exist. The same would be true in an
experimental setting, i.e. all subjects in an experimental group could identify themselves as a single group
in addition to any further group manipulation; but this does not prevent us from identifying experimentally
the effects of having a further group manipulation, and this is what HHZ already do. As a result, we find it
simpler to rely just on the standard terminology of talking of either partitioning subjects into groups or not
having groups; and we follow others (such as Chen and Li 2009; Chen and Chen 2010 and HHZ) in doing
so.
6Table 2 of Chen and Li (2009) shows evidence of positive discrimination but, arguably, stronger evidence
of negative discrimination in their sequential bargaining games. The findings on negative discrimination
stand in contrast with the emphasis by some on positive discrimination (e.g., Brewer 1999).
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Our focus is on a simple, financially incentivized, deception-free behavioral ex-
periment that implements our experimental treatment manipulations in a minimal
way. We differ from experimental psychology research looking at relative group size
and status effects as the latter’s focus is typically (a) on attitudes rather than be-
havior (e.g., Ellemers et al. 1992; Jost and Burgess 2000; Lücken and Simon 2005;
Voci 2006); (b) when behavior is involved, deception is systematically used in in-
voking the connection between responses and behavior (e.g., Sachdev and Bourhis
1985, 1991); (c) deception is more generally and systematically employed in treat-
ment manipulations and elsewhere in the experimental design (e.g., all the studies
listed under parts a and b). This is not to say that this psychological research is not
useful: it clearly is; our aim is simply to complement it using an experimental eco-
nomic methodology.7 The early experimental research on in-group favoritism (e.g.,
Tajfel 1970) is also relevant but more distant from what we do, since it neither dis-
tinguishes between positive and negative discrimination nor does it look at issues of
group size and status.
Experiments with natural groups are less likely to employ deception (e.g., Aberson
and Howanski’s, 2002, attitudinal study), but, as noted above, once natural groups as
opposed to artificial groups are introduced, the question arises of disentangling what
we might label as the ‘pure’ effect of group membership and intergroup relations
from what may be, and often plausibly are, expectations and stereotyping effects at
play (e.g., Arifovic et al. 2012; Liebkind et al. 2008). This is what makes employing
artificial groups desirable in a first step to identify the pure causal impact of relative
size and status.
Our experimental design benchmark is from HHZ. To identify relative group size
effects, all we do, relative to the random color group assignment treatment of HHZ,
is to vary the group size from the two HHZ groups of 6 subjects each to having
one group of 8 subjects and one group of 4 subjects.8 We control for absolute group
size effects by also having control treatments in which we either pair two groups of
4 subjects each or we pair two groups of 8 subjects each.9 To identify status effects,
all we do is to change the labeling frame we adopt in experimental sessions: rather
than talking of a Blue group and a Red group (as we do in the other treatments,
finding symmetrical results as HHZ do), we phrase the instructions in terms of a Blue
group and in terms of subjects who are “not belonging to any group” or “outsiders
to the group”. This is a minimal status group manipulation: that of being in a first
group and that of being in a second group which is defined purely negatively by
not being a member of the first group. Such a minimal status group manipulation
arguably has the advantage of improving the interpretability of the results relative
to stronger manipulations based on entitlements inducing quizzes and/or a public
7Glaeser et al. (2000) and Fehr et al. (2003) look at the relationship between survey responses and experi-
mental behavior.
8We rely on random matching so that each player has equal probability to play with any other player in
the laboratory. Section 4 contains a further discussion.
9Larger majorities and smaller minorities are of course of interest for future research, but they are not
suitable for a first study since, because of the random matching mechanism needed (see previous footnote),
it would reduce considerably the amount of data from insider–outsider interaction, and the likelihood to
have the power to detect intergroup discrimination in the lab.
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ceremony at the end of the experiment. Deservingness perceptions—as induced by
quizzes - is an alternative obvious source of differential behavior (e.g., Hoffman and
Spitzer 1985), and public ceremonies may increase the likelihood of experimenter
demand effects driving the results. The subtlety of our cue helps reduce the likelihood
of experimenter demand effects; we use a variant of a Holt and Laury (2002) task
as an extra control for whether such effects drive our results, and we find that they
do not.10 It also has external validity. This is because it mirrors the way in which
sometimes low status is associated to being perceived as being outsiders to the high
status groups, as the buraku are relative to the four recognized ranks of traditional
Japanese society (Sugimoto, 2003).
To give a preview of key findings, there is evidence of comparatively low morale
associated to low status and minority subjects. There is also evidence of deference,
in different ways, towards high status and majority subjects respectively. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the experimental design
and results, respectively. Section 4 discusses the results, while Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Outline and stage 1
The experiment was conducted in January and February 2010 at the University of East
Anglia.11 Other than for the experimental instructions, the experiment was comput-
erized using the software z-Tree platform (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were mostly
students from various subject backgrounds. A total of 312 subjects participated in
the 26 sessions. Subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory in partitioned com-
puter terminals. Subjects read the instructions and answered a computerized control
questionnaire, to check understanding, before moving on with the tasks. They were
advised individually if they gave any incorrect answers. The experimental instruc-
tions had a neutral frame (e.g., did not refer to ‘trust’, ‘trusters’ or ‘trustees’) except
for the context manipulations specified below. We used ‘experimental points’ as cur-
rency, each worth 4 UK pence (0.04 pounds).
We had three key experimental treatments, each with two groups per session: two
groups frame, one with a majority of 8 subjects and the other with a minority of
4 subjects (84); one group frame, with the majority group of 8 being labeled as ‘the
group’ engaging with 4 outsiders (S4); one group frame, with the minority group of
4 being labeled as ‘the group’ engaging with 8 outsiders (S8). As controls for the
analysis, we also ran two additional treatments: two groups frame of 8 subjects (88);
two groups frame of 4 subjects (44); and we also relied on the no groups (B) and the
two groups of 6 subjects each with equal frequencies to play with the same and other
group members (66) treatments reported in HHZ.12
10See Zizzo (2010) for a discussion of experimenter demand effects. Section 4 contains a further discussion
of our status manipulation.
11The experimental instructions are provided at http://www.uea.ac.uk/~ec601/MinExpEAppendix2.pdf.
12 B had 5 sessions and 66 had 4 sessions, implying a total of an additional 9 × 12 = 108 subjects for the
data analysis. 66 is labeled as C treatment in HHZ; we have changed the labeling to make it more congruent
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At the start of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to one of two
groups, to be made of either 4 or 8 subjects depending on the treatment, and this
was common knowledge. In two groups frame treatments, the groups were labeled
the Red group and the Blue group.13 In the one group frame treatments, there are a
Blue group and four or eight Not Blue subjects (depending on the treatment) who in
the instructions are referred to as “not belonging to any group” or “outsiders to the
group”.
Our key experimental treatments are those looking at majorities, minorities and
difference in status: 84, S4 and S8. 84 considers the effect of having a majority and a
minority framed as providing two group identities of equal status except for the po-
tential implications of being a majority group or a minority group. S4 and S8 consider
the effect of differential status by having a single group labeled as such, as discussed
in the introduction and further in Sect. 4. In S4, the majority group of 8 is the high
status (Blue), framed group and the group of 4 is the unlabeled, low status group (Not
Blue); in S8, the minority group of 4 is the high status, framed group and the group
of 8 is the low status group.
Any difference in behavior from being in the majority or in the minority may
however not be due to any majority-minority effect (whether or not combined with
a 1 group frame effect) but rather to the absolute size of the group (4 or 8 subjects).
In 44 and 88 there are no majorities and minorities, but by having groups of 4 (in
44) and of 8 (in 88) we are able to control for absolute group size effects. 44 and 88
do however change the absolute number of people participating to each experimental
session (8 and 16, respectively, relative to the 12 of the other treatments), and to
control for this as well we can employ the experimental data from 66 in HHZ. Finally,
there is a question about what would happen if there were no groups, and the B
treatment from HHZ provides such a useful baseline.
Each session was divided into four stages plus four additional behavioral tasks, and
the overall experimental sequence and set of treatments is summarized in Table 1.
2.2 Stage 1
Stage 1 had three rounds of a Berg et al. (1995) basic trust game and was common to
all treatments. It aimed to provide subjects practice and experience with trust games.
The truster (the ‘First Mover’) received 24 experimental points and chose how many
points (if any) to give to the other person and how many (if any) to keep. All the
points given were multiplied by a conversion rate of 3 before they were received
by the trustee (the ‘Second Mover’). The trustee then decided how much (if any) to
keep and how much (if any) to return to the truster. Subjects were matched randomly
with that of our experimental treatments. Using two treatments from HHZ as baselines is especially useful
as the subject samples were comparable, as (a) they were run in the same university and so with the same
kind of subject pool and (b) the same experimenter (namely, the first author of this paper) materially
conducted both our experimental sessions and those reported in HHZ.
13In treatment 84, three sessions were run with the Red group as the majority group and three with the
Blue group as the majority group. Hence the numbers subjects in the Red and Blue are the same in the all
two frame treatments.
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Table 1 Experimental treatments and experimental sequence
Treatment Two frames One frame No frame
Blue Red Blue Not Blue
Main treatments
84 8 (4) 4 (8)
S4 8 4
S8 4 8
Control treatments
B 12
66 6 6
44 4 4
88 8 8
Experimental sequence Task Number of rounds
Stage 1 Trust games 3
Stage 2 Market 1 or Waiting Period 1, trust games 6
Stage 3 Market 2 or Waiting Period 2, trust games 6
Stage 4 Market 3 or Waiting Period 3, trust games 6
Notes: In the top two panels, the number of subjects in each group (or everyone in the experimental
session, for the B treatment) is listed (in the 84 treatment, either the Blue group has 8 subjects and the Red
group 4 subjects, or vice versa). Regarding the bottom panel, at the start of each of stages 2, 3, and 4, the
experiment had a waiting period in the B treatment, and markets for group(s) in the 66, 88, 44, 84, S8 and
S4 treatments (technically, there were two markets, one to pay for membership of each of the two groups)
and anonymously each round.14 The only information they received was about their
round co-player’s decision and about their own round earnings; in treatments with
groups, they had no information about the color group of co-players.
2.3 Stages 2 through 4
Trust games In stages 2, 3 and 4 subjects played six trust games as in stage 1, but
with the following differences. Each round trusters were allocated 48 points rather
than the 24 of stage 1. In each round they were randomly matched with another
participant in the room, and informed whether the co-player belonged to the Blue
group or to the Red group or to no group, though they were not told their identity.
They were assigned three times the role of trusters and three times that of trustees.
They were provided, on a round-by-round basis, with a table containing information
on average giving rates and average return rates by members of each group (or “not
14They were asked to make decisions within 1 minute and a half, and a small clock on the computer
display informed them of how much time they had. In practice, however, they could take more, though
they rarely did.
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belonging to any group”) with respect to insiders and outsiders.15 In addition, they
received a summary table with average giving and return rates for each stage from
the second onwards by members of each group with respect to insiders and outsiders.
Market for groups phase Before stages 2, 3 and 4 of the trust games were played,
there was a market for groups as in HHZ. Subjects had an endowment of 48 points. In
the two groups frame treatments, they were first asked to state whether, if they could
choose and both options were free, they would rather stay in their group or switch to
the other. If he or she stated they would rather switch, then they became a potential
buyer for the membership of the other group and they were asked how much they
were willing to pay to swap places with a member of the other group. They could
state any value between 0 and 48 points, the value of their endowment. If the subjects
stated they would rather stay, they became a potential seller of group membership and
were asked to state how much they would need to be paid by a member of the other
group in order to swap places, again with an upper limit of 48 points. Subjects could
also state that they were not willing to switch group at any price within the allowed
range (0 to 48 points).
The one group frame treatments were identical in structure but the instructions
were framed in terms of being in or out of the Blue group. For all treatments, the
market then operated as a Walrasian clearinghouse, where the price was set so that
the number of sellers was equal to the number of buyers of membership of the other
group. Whenever there was a range of possible market-clearing prices, the lowest
market-clearing price was chosen. As in HHZ, the mechanism only operated by swap-
ping players between groups, so that each group remained with the same number of
subjects throughout the experiment.16
2.4 End of experiment tasks
At the end of the experiment we had four behavioral tasks presented in randomized
order and aimed to try to measure risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion
and sensitivity to experimenter demand.17 They corresponded to (a) a standard Holt
and Laury (2002) questionnaire in the domain of gains; (b) an equivalent task in the
domain of losses; (c) an ambiguity aversion task; and (d) a sensitivity to experimenter
demand task. The tasks details are provided in the experimental instructions. The
number of times subjects choose the safer option can be taken as a measure of risk
attitude in task a. Task b consisted in a set of choices between risky options as in
a, but framed in terms of losses rather than in gains; we combine task a choices of
the safer option with task b choices of the riskier option to get a proxy for degree
of loss aversion.18 Task c followed the lead of Engle-Warnick and Laszlo (2006)
15We provided this information for comparability with Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009). It enables us to
enhance the scope for learning in repeated group interaction where subjects know how subjects are faring.
As it could inadvertently set a norm or target amount of trust that the subjects might try to meet in later
rounds, though, future research could consider giving subjects no or less feedback.
16Subjects were told that they should make their market decisions within four minutes.
17Due to a computer failure, we were not able to collect this data for one session of treatment 88.
18A loss aversion subject would be risk loving in the domain of losses while being risk averse in the
domain of gains.
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and offered a choice between an increasingly ambiguous lottery and the same lottery
disambiguated but at a price in terms of lower expected value. The number of times
subjects went for the unambiguous measure can be used as a measure of ambiguous
aversion.
Task d presented an option between two lottery choices, one increasingly dom-
inated by the other; the dominated option was characterized by a smiley face and
a sentence stating that “it would be nice if some of you were to choose” such an
option. The nudge provided towards choosing the dominated lotteries was signif-
icant by the standard of what we know about experimenter demand effects (see
Zizzo 2010), abbreviated as EDE in what follows, with the smiley face provid-
ing a social cue to interpret the sentence being provided. It provided a clear cue
for subjects to behave in a way compliant to experimenter demand, even when
they need to pay money to do so, and as such it is a measure of sensitivity to
EDE.19 It is not just a generic measure of conformism since the nudge clearly
comes from the experimenter. As a result, we measure the degree of EDE sensi-
tivity as the number of dominated options choices being made. Zizzo and Fleming
(2011) used a psychological questionnaire instrument and a combination of a dic-
tator and money burning game as alternative measures to capture EDE sensitivity;
relative to the first measure, our Holt and Laury variant measure had the advan-
tage of providing an incentivized measure; relative to the second measure, and given
the interpersonal nature of our experiment and potential spillovers across tasks, it
had the advantage of not involving actions affecting other subjects in the experi-
ment.
2.5 Payments
Each session lasted around 75 minutes. The average earnings were 14.39 UK pounds
per subject (approximately 22–23 US dollars). Payment was based on the earnings
from each of the markets; plus those from a randomly chosen round from each of the
four stages; plus those from one of the ten choices for each of the end of experiment
tasks, with any relevant lottery being played out by the computer. Subjects were pri-
vately paid and left the laboratory one at a time in an order designed to minimize the
likelihood of seeing each other.
19An alternative interpretation of our behavioral measure is that it captures subjects being nice towards
the experimenter as opposed to a form of experimenter demand effect. The problem with this argument is
that being nice towards the experimenter could precisely be interpreted as a form of experimenter demand
effect; while the argument that the manipulation simply captures subjects being nice, i.e. altruistic, does
not explain why it does not correlate with greater average trust or trustworthiness. Furthermore, the fact
that face based stimuli are sufficient to induce compliant behavior (e.g., Bateson et al. 2006; Burnham and
Hare 2007; Haley and Fessler 2005) makes clear that such visual aids are effective in providing social
meaning towards the choice of the dominated option. Note that we could not say that “it would be nice
if all of you were to choose” the dominated option, since this sentence would in fact have been deceptive
given our experimental goals (the usefulness of the measure is in having a distribution of subjects based
on the measure).
K. Tsutsui, D.J. Zizzo
2.6 Relationship to baseline treatments from HHZ
The 66 treatment was identical in stages 1 through 4 structure to that of our experi-
mental treatments under a two groups frame, with the key difference being that there
were two groups of six subjects.20
The B treatment had 12 subjects per session as the 66, 84, S8 and S4 treatments.
There was no assignment to groups. Stage 1 was identical to stage 1 of the other
treatments. Stages 2, 3 and 4 had no market for groups. In its place, at the beginning
of each of stages 2, 3 and 4, there was a two minutes waiting period, at the start of
which subjects were paid an additional 48 points. This was meant to mirror the other
treatments, both by providing the same money amounts and by creating a temporal
wedge between trust game tasks. Stage 2, 3 and 4 trust games were as in the other
treatments, to mirror the information provided in stages 2, 3 and 4 of the other treat-
ments, the computer screen displayed information on average giving rate and average
return rate, with a summary table on average giving and return rates from stage 2 on-
wards being provided at the end of each stage. None of the HHZ treatments tried to
control for risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and experimenter demand
sensitivity by the means of end of experiment tasks.
3 Experimental results
3.1 Giving and return rates21
We define the giving rate as the fraction of the endowment given by trusters to
trustees, and the return rate as the fraction of the amount received by trusters which
is returned by the trustees to the trusters (where the amount received by trustees is
3 times what was given in all treatments).
Figure 1 displays giving and return rates in the key treatments (84, S8 and S4)
highlighting the role of majorities, minorities and one group framing.22 Table 2 dis-
plays giving and return rates across stages in all treatments, including the various
controls. Table 3 employs regression analysis on mean Stage 2–4 giving and return
rate by each subject to verify treatment effects and the role of possible covariates.
20A second small difference concerned the matching rule. HHZ’s matching rule ensure that in every stage
subjects were precisely matched the same number of times with insiders and outsiders, although this im-
plied that the likelihood of being rematched with insiders and outsiders was slightly different. We could
not retain this constraint with the uneven number of subjects in our key treatments and so we opted instead
for pure random matching in our experiment, with any other subject in the room being equally likely to be
matched with any given subject, no matter the group.
21Throughout the paper, in bivariate tests statistical significance is estimated by treating session averages
as the unit of observation, in order to control for possible non-independence of choices within each session.
Also throughout the paper, all reported tests are two tailed except where otherwise specified
22We verified whether there is any difference in giving and return rates between the three sessions where
the Blue group was the majority group and the three sessions where the Red group was the majority
group. While samples are too small to make meaningful comparison (n = 6), the only difference reaching
significance is between average return rates (Mann–Whitney P = 0.05) but this is only different by around
3–4 % and it is so already from stage 1.
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Fig. 1 Giving and return rates
in Stages 2–4
Table 2 Giving and return rates
B 66 88 44 84 S8 S4
Stage 1 giving rate 0.562 0.457 0.433 0.350 0.367 0.477 0.413
Stage 2–4 giving rate 0.558 0.369 0.316 0.303 0.305 0.318 0.275
to own group members 0.449 0.348 0.344 0.333 0.334 0.319
to other group members 0.288 0.289 0.249 0.265 0.296 0.213
Stage 1 return rate 0.318 0.219 0.270 0.304 0.226 0.270 0.238
Stage 2–4 return rate 0.252 0.153 0.173 0.157 0.166 0.189 0.163
to own group members 0.200 0.185 0.187 0.177 0.204 0.170
to other group members 0.106 0.161 0.110 0.148 0.168 0.151
Regressions 1 and 2 refer to giving rates when subjects play with own and other
group members respectively. Regressions 3 and 4 are on return rates. In the regres-
sions, error clustering is used to take into account the possible non-independence of
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Table 3 Regressions on mean giving and return rate
Regressions on stage
2–4 mean giving rate
Regression 1 (to own group) Regression 2 (to other group)
β t p β t p
Stage 1 giving rate 0.424 7.93 0.000 0.293 5.51 0.000
Stage 1 return rate 0.143 1.92 0.064 0.242 3.32 0.002
Group −0.059 −0.72 0.477 −0.214 −3.16 0.003
GroupOf8 −0.061 −0.63 0.536 0.012 0.20 0.841
GroupOf4 −0.040 −0.43 0.669 −0.017 −0.29 0.771
Majority −0.010 −0.13 0.899 −0.045 −1.15 0.258
Minority 0.020 0.29 0.774 0.061 1.27 0.211
NotBlue −0.117 −2.17 0.037 −0.048 −0.98 0.335
Gender −0.040 −1.34 0.190 −0.004 −0.12 0.904
EcMgt −0.012 −0.40 0.695 −0.021 −0.89 0.380
UK 0.062 2.00 0.053 0.039 1.77 0.086
China 0.015 0.30 0.764 −0.023 −0.55 0.588
Age 0.000 −0.14 0.890 0.002 1.09 0.284
Constant 0.272 3.32 0.002 0.246 3.29 0.002
n = 328, R2 = 0.324 n = 327, R2 = 0.366
Regressions on stage
2–4 mean return rate
Regression 3 (to own group) Regression 4 (to other group)
β t p β t p
Trust rate as 2nd mover 0.131 2.38 0.023 0.089 1.56 0.128
Stage 1 giving rate 0.060 1.82 0.078 0.015 0.51 0.615
Stage 1 return rate 0.186 2.67 0.012 0.230 5.62 0.000
Group −0.009 −0.28 0.783 −0.095 −2.60 0.014
GroupOf8 −0.003 −0.12 0.906 0.036 1.51 0.141
GroupOf4 −0.012 −0.45 0.657 −0.014 −0.58 0.568
Majority −0.006 −0.30 0.765 −0.005 −0.20 0.845
Minority 0.013 0.35 0.731 0.069 2.17 0.037
NotBlue −0.026 −1.35 0.186 −0.031 −1.32 0.197
Gender −0.029 −1.60 0.120 −0.019 −0.86 0.396
EcMgt −0.031 −1.63 0.112 0.014 0.53 0.599
UK −0.012 −0.62 0.542 −0.019 −1.02 0.316
China −0.015 −0.59 0.561 −0.057 −1.93 0.062
Age 0.000 0.24 0.808 0.001 0.43 0.671
Constant 0.100 1.79 0.083 0.126 1.95 0.059
n = 324, R2 = 0.175 n = 318, R2 = 0.234
Notes: We employ error clustering to control for session level effects
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observations by different subjects in the same session.23 We have treatment dummies
for Group (= 1 in all treatments except B), GroupOf8 and GroupOf4 (= 1 if subject
belongs to group of 8 subjects or 4 subjects, respectively), Majority (= 1 if subject
belongs to strict majority), Minority (= 1 if subject belongs to strict minority) and
NotBlue (= 1 if subject is in the low status framed group). The return rate regres-
sions have Giving Rate received as the Second Mover as an independent variable:
that is, the mean stages 2–4 giving rate the subject has received when playing as a
trustee. This allows us to control for the positive relationship which we might expect
between giving rate and return rate. Both giving and return rate regressions control
for Stage 1 giving and return rates.24 Various dummy variables capture individual-
specific heterogeneity: stage 1 giving and return rate, age, and dummies for gender
(= 1 for women), economics or management educational background (= 1 if appli-
cable) and nationality (UK = 1 for UK subjects and China = 1 for Chinese subjects).
Result 1 Low status subjects trust less other low status subjects.
Support Figure 1 is suggestive of this result as trust rates from low status subjects
to other low status subjects appear lower than trust rates from high status subjects to
other high status subjects in both S8 and S4. According to Regression 1, low status
(Not Blue) subjects give 12 percentage points less to other low status subjects (P =
0.037). Figure 1 clearly shows, in relation to one frame treatment sessions, that Not
Blue subjects give less to other Not Blue subjects. While Blue trusters gave 40.6 %
of their endowment to other Blue trusters, Not Blue trusters only gave 26.2 % of their
endowment (Wilcoxon P = 0.028) in the 10 sessions of S8 and S4 treatments.
Result 2 Controlling for covariates, minority subjects return more to majority sub-
jects.
Support Regression 4 in Table 3 shows that minority subjects have a higher return
rate (by 7 percentage points) towards majority subjects, and this is statistically sig-
nificant (P = 0.037). Among the key treatments, Fig. 1 shows that this result is not
apparent from 84 and S4 and appears to be driven by treatment S8, where the minority
subjects are also the low status group.
Other results Overall, there remains evidence for negative discrimination both in
giving rates and in return rates. We could not find any statistically significant change
in discrimination in either giving or return rates across rounds in different treat-
ments.25 Regressions 1 and 3 in Table 3 show that the introduction of groups per
23We have also run random effects regressions getting the same broad picture in terms of mean giving rates,
whereas estimates of regressions on mean return rates collapses to OLS estimates due to zero variance
being explained by the session level random coefficients; this leaves OLS with error clustering as the
better estimation option.
24This might occur for a number of psychological motives which have been documented in other exper-
iments, such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2001) or
trust responsiveness (Guerra and Zizzo 2004).
25Each round average level for each session was the unit of observation that was matched with period
number for computing these correlations.
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se does not increase giving and return rates to same group members; the coefficients
are actually negative, albeit statistically insignificant. Regressions 2 and 4 show that,
when controlling for a number of covariates including (in relation to return rates)
behavioral reciprocity, the introduction of groups decreases giving rates to the other
group members by around 20 percentage points and return rates by around 9 percent-
age points. Clearly, when it comes to majority and high status subjects, there is no
reason to expect anything other than negative discrimination. We also could not find
any statistically significant change in discrimination in either giving or return rates
across rounds in different treatments.26
In Table 3, discrimination in giving rate is defined (as in HHZ) as giving rate
(stages 2–4) in group treatments minus giving rate (stages 2–4) in B treatment (sim-
ilarly for the return rate). An alternative measure would be to consider [giving rate
(stages 2–4) − giving rate (stage 1) in group treatments] minus [giving rate (stages
2–4) − giving rate (stage 1) in B treatment]. A parallel measure could be construed
for the return rate.27 A difficulty with these measures is that they do not prevent the
possibility that in stage 1 of the group treatments giving and return rates may already
be affected by the expectation of interaction with non-group members, which may
lead subjects prone to negative group discrimination to already lower their giving
and return rate in stage 1. The comparatively low giving rate and return rate already
in stage 1 of the groups treatments, relative to the B treatment, is at least consistent
with this possibility.28 Nevertheless, even if these alternative measures are used, the
finding on negative discrimination remains is replicated, at least in relation to giving
rates (see online Appendix B).
Our regression analysis in Table 3 controls for absolute group size effects and finds
no evidence for them as GroupOf8 and GroupOf4 are statistically insignificant in all
regressions of Table 3. A cursory look at Table 2 confirms this view, with giving and
return rates in 44, 66 and 88 being similar and with no trend upwards or downwards
based on group size.
Among the other covariates of Table 3, there is evidence of a relationship be-
tween giving and return rate in Regressions 1, 2 and 3, though less so in Regression 4
(P = 0.064, one tailed). There is also various (though not universal) evidence of de-
pendence on giving and/or return rates in stage 1, which may be due to a combination
of individual characteristics and learning dynamics.29
26Each round’s average level for each session was the unit of observation that was matched with round
number for computing these correlations.
27A nice feature of these measures is that, like those of Table 3, they do control for learning effects.
Conversely, a simpler measure of these measures that neglected the B treatment information entirely and
simply focused on ‘giving rate (stages 2–4) − giving rate (stage 1) in group treatments’ cannot separate
out the effect of group information from that of learning effects.
28Regressions on stage 1 giving and return rates are presented in the online Appendix B. They show that
return rates are indeed statistically significantly lower already in stage 1 in the B treatment than in the
group treatments; however, this is not significantly the case for giving rates.
29The two may of course interact: for example, subjects may acquire information about the social pref-
erence distribution in the population by the stage 1 play experience (e.g., Levine 1998). No individual
specific dummy variable is statistically significant at P < 0.05 or better, although there is marginal evi-
dence (P < 0.1) for UK subjects to give more (Regressions 1 and 2) and for Chinese students to return
less to different group status subjects (Regression 4).
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3.2 Perceived values and discrimination
We now focus on the treatments with groups. This is (a) to try to get an under-
standing about whether subjects value groups equally depending on whether they
are majority or minority groups, or whether they are framed as not belonging to
any group at all; and (b) to get a better understanding of discrimination using
perceived value information and, in the subset of experimental treatments that we
ran (and so excluding 66 from HHZ), information from the end of experiment
tasks.
Perceived value measurement We measure perceived value subjects placed on own
group membership by the extent to which subjects place a value on own group mem-
bership in excess of its material value. The markets at the start of stages 2, 3 and 4
provided an incentive-compatible mechanism for the revelation of individual prefer-
ences for staying in one’s own group (the willingness to accept, WTA, value) or for
switching groups (the willingness to pay, WTP, value). As there were repeated mar-
kets, subjects also had the opportunity to gain experience both about the nature of
the social commodity being traded (i.e. membership of a given group) and about the
market mechanism itself.30
WTA(own) is the positive price a subject needed to be paid to be willing to switch
and WTP(own) is equivalent to a negative price on own group membership, and so
they reveal the value that an individual places on membership of his or her group.
Figure 2 provides information on WTA and WTP values observed in the experi-
ment.
We use HHZ’s simple perceived value measure M as equal for each subject and
market to WTA(own) or—WTP(own), whichever is the case.31 All of our experi-
mental treatments, and 66 from HHZ, are such that group membership does not
imply, either directly or in terms of frequency of interaction, a financial advantage
in being inside rather than outside a group. It is possible, however, that, if sub-
jects find that one group is more profitable than another in terms of actual history
of trust and trustworthiness with respect to the two groups, this may affect group
valuations. We address this endogeneity problem by including regression analysis
with stage 2 psychological values as dependent variable, as stage 2 valuations are
provided before any feedback is received on within-group andbetween-group perfor-
mance.32
30HHZ discuss whether this is a genuine psychological benefit rather than the artifact of well known
mechanisms, like reference dependence. They conclude that, at least partially, it corresponds to genuine
perceived value.
31In HHZ, this is the most effective measure in predicting discrimination, but we shall refer to other
measures in the next footnote.
32One could still argue, even in this case, that what matters is the expectation of material gains from
belonging to a given group, and, while under the null hypothesis of no discrimination these should not
differ between treatments, the same cannot be guaranteed if this null hypothesis is rejected. To address this
point, we also carried robustness checks in our analysis by computing the following expectation-corrected
measure (see online Appendices D and E): we take M minus the expectation of the material gain from a
switch when these expectations of material gains are formed rationally (i.e., the expected relative material
gain/loss is the same as actually occurs by remaining in the group in stage 2).
K. Tsutsui, D.J. Zizzo
Fig. 2 Histogram of
willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept (WTA) in
relation to the other group
Notes: The histograms are built from individual choices; n = 210
for −WTP observations (mean = 9.986, standard deviation (s.d.) =
11.759) and n = 810 (mean = 30.095, s.d. = 16.132) for WTA obser-
vations. The white column stands for choices of not being willing to
accept any price up to 48 to switch group
Another problem with the average M measure of the mean psychological ben-
efit from own group membership is that subjects could state that they were not
willing to lose their membership at any allowed price between 0 and 48 points.
9.5 % of the choices were of this ‘definite stay’ kind (between 5.6 and 13.4 % in
different treatments). We chose two routes to deal with this problem. M contains
all observations, but conservatively introduces a valuation of 49 for these definite
stays: since the lower bound for valuations was—48 (the budget), if anything, for
x > 49, this introduces a downward bias. Mb simply omits ‘definite stay’ observa-
tions and also introduces a downward bias in average M estimates. Either way, in
the light of possible downward biases, our average M estimates should be interpreted
as conservative estimates of the revealed perceived values of own group member-
ship.
Results on perceived values Table 4 presents M and Mb mean values by treatment,
while Fig. 3 illustrates mean M and Mb values graphically focusing on our key treat-
ments 84, S8 and S4.33
Figure 3 makes clear that for all groups in 84, S8 and S4, including those framed
as outsiders, the perceived value is positive.34 To investigate the determinants of per-
ceived values, we present some regression analysis on M (Regressions 5 and 7) and
33The same qualitative results emerge if expectations-corrected measures of psychological values are used
instead (see online Appendix C for details).
34Psychological value in all the sessions and whatever the measure used (Wicoxon P < 0.001 across
the 30 sessions of all treatments, including the controls). Note that psychological values are very similar
between the three 84 sessions in which the Blue group is the majority group (e.g., M = 22.241) and those
in which the Red group is the majority group (e.g., M = 23.546).
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Table 4 Mean psychological values
Treatment Stage M Mb
Majority Minority Majority Minority
66 2 21.04 19.83
3 24.65 23.02
4 21.06 17.81
Total 22.25 20.25
88 2 21.11 20.03
3 17.91 15.84
4 20.09 16.88
Total 19.70 17.61
44 2 24.95 24.33
3 24.40 22.41
4 22.45 19.50
Total 23.93 22.14
84 2 21.94 24.31 17.21 21.56 24.31 15.83
3 24.71 27.63 18.88 21.67 24.57 16.14
4 22.03 24.15 17.79 17.16 18.41 14.95
Total 22.89 25.36 17.96 20.23 22.61 15.64
(NotBlue) (Blue) (NotBlue) (Blue)
S8 2 18.72 11.40 33.35 15.96 10.44 29.44
3 20.90 18.63 25.45 15.94 15.25 17.60
4 16.08 10.95 26.35 11.02 6.72 20.69
Total 18.57 13.66 28.38 14.33 10.79 22.68
(Blue) (NotBlue) (Blue) (NotBlue)
S4 2 31.23 34.70 24.30 28.89 33.11 19.94
3 26.73 32.40 15.40 22.80 28.88 11.67
4 25.27 30.18 15.45 22.13 28.65 7.06
Total 27.74 32.43 18.38 24.63 30.24 12.98
Mb (Regressions 6 and 8) in Table 5, again controlling for possible session level spe-
cific effects by using error clustering; Table 6 has the corresponding regressions with
just stage 2 M (Regressions 9 and 11) and Mb (Regressions 10 and 12) as dependent
variables.35
35Random effects regressions on perceived values collapse to OLS estimates due to zero variance being
explained by the session level random coefficients; this again leaves OLS with error clustering as the better
estimation option.
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Fig. 3 Mean psychological
values
The independent variables are all those from Table 3 that can be defined in the
subsample. Regressions 7 and 8 restrict the samples to those sessions for which end
of experiment tasks have been measured, thus both treatments B and 66 are ex-
cluded. While losing statistical power, these analyses are able to include Holt and
Laury (2002) variants proxies for Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion, Ambiguity Aver-
sion and EDE Sensitivity, i.e. sensitivity to experimenter demand effects. Risk aver-
sion is proxied by the number of risk averse choices in the domain of gains; Loss
Aversion by the sum of risk averse choices in the domain of gains and risk lov-
ing choices in the domain of losses; Ambiguity Aversion and EDE Sensitivity re-
spectively by the number of ambiguity averse and experimenter demand compliant
choices.
Result 3 When covariates are controlled for, subjects appear to like being in ma-
jorities. In the differential status treatments, subjects dislike being in the low status
group.
Group status, minorities and trust
Table 5 Regressions on psychological value
Regression 5, mean M Regression 6, mean Mb
β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −2.233 −1.15 0.258 −3.152 −1.29 0.207
Majority 7.781 4.11 0.000 8.808 3.50 0.002
Minority 2.817 0.77 0.447 −0.237 −0.06 0.954
NotBlue −13.884 −4.41 0.000 −16.308 −4.51 0.000
Gender 3.223 1.71 0.098 3.138 1.58 0.125
EcMgt −3.988 −1.62 0.115 −3.410 −1.27 0.215
UK 1.249 0.63 0.535 2.260 1.16 0.254
China −3.925 −1.41 0.168 −5.011 −1.52 0.138
Age 0.323 1.82 0.079 0.161 0.86 0.395
Constant 13.842 2.42 0.022 15.828 2.85 0.008
n = 358, R2 = 0.113 n = 353, R2 = 0.126
Regression 7, mean M Regression 8, mean Mb
β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −3.291 −1.63 0.116 −4.392 −2.18 0.039
Majority 7.499 3.52 0.002 8.856 3.24 0.004
Minority 1.680 0.50 0.624 −1.264 −0.34 0.733
NotBlue −13.487 −4.56 0.000 −15.970 −4.47 0.000
Gender 3.846 1.76 0.091 3.969 1.79 0.087
EcMgt −4.318 −1.57 0.128 −4.102 −1.38 0.180
UK 1.383 0.57 0.575 2.010 0.79 0.438
China −5.939 −2.31 0.030 −7.258 −2.14 0.043
Age 0.233 0.97 0.342 0.106 0.43 0.669
Risk Aversion −1.368 −0.71 0.485 −0.484 −0.26 0.793
Loss Aversion 1.381 0.62 0.543 0.464 0.22 0.829
Ambiguity
Aversion
−2.110 −0.90 0.376 −0.805 −0.36 0.719
EDE Sensitivity 0.170 0.34 0.740 0.094 0.16 0.873
Constant 21.490 2.73 0.012 20.405 2.83 0.009
n = 294, R2 = 0.159 n = 289, R2 = 0.159
Notes: We employ error clustering to control for session level effects
Support We are not able to detect statistically significant differences between aggre-
gate majority and minority mean values. However, in the regression analysis where
covariates are controlled for, we find that the Majority dummy is significant across
all regressions: subjects are willing to pay 5–9 points more on average for being in a
majority group (P < 0.05).
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Table 6 Regressions on Stage 2 psychological value
Regression 9, mean M Regression 10, mean Mb
β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −0.496 −0.20 0.845 −0.936 −0.37 0.715
Majority 5.050 2.25 0.032 6.100 3.16 0.004
Minority 7.219 1.69 0.101 3.821 0.77 0.447
NotBlue −13.573 −4.31 0.000 −15.311 −5.21 0.000
Gender 3.252 1.40 0.171 3.109 1.37 0.181
EcMgt −3.033 −0.95 0.352 −2.342 −0.72 0.474
UK 4.665 2.15 0.040 5.477 2.52 0.017
China 0.393 0.10 0.923 0.659 0.17 0.864
Age 0.516 2.60 0.015 0.448 2.25 0.032
Constant 6.825 1.21 0.237 7.397 1.26 0.218
n = 358, R2 = 0.070 n = 340, R2 = 0.076
Regression 11, mean M Regression 12, mean Mb
β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −3.496 −1.66 0.110 −5.054 −2.66 0.014
Majority 4.945 2.09 0.047 6.442 3.37 0.003
Minority 4.609 1.09 0.286 0.571 0.12 0.908
NotBlue −13.658 −4.41 0.000 −15.345 −5.07 0.000
Gender 4.018 1.63 0.116 3.5 1.45 0.160
EcMgt −6.161 −1.62 0.119 −5.141 −1.38 0.179
UK 4.049 1.43 0.165 5.129 1.73 0.096
China 2.562 0.56 0.578 2.909 0.68 0.502
Age 0.451 1.85 0.077 0.362 1.48 0.153
Risk Aversion −1.224 −0.51 0.616 −0.818 −0.33 0.743
Loss Aversion 1.852 0.73 0.470 1.415 0.55 0.589
Ambiguity Aversion 2.372 0.91 0.371 1.775 0.66 0.515
EDE Sensitivity 0.082 0.13 0.899 0.131 0.19 0.851
Constant 12.742 1.62 0.118 13.461 1.66 0.110
n = 294, R2 = 0.100 n = 278, R2 = 0.102
Notes: We employ error clustering to control for session level effects
In relation to the second part of the result, consistently across Tables 5 and 6
regressions, the coefficients on NotBlue willing imply that subjects are willing to
pay less for being low status members by 13–16 points (P < 0.001). This is further
corroborated by bivariate tests (Wicoxon P < 0.007 in relation to the M measure
and P < 0.037 in relation to the Mb measure in the 10 sessions of S4 and S8): in
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treatment S8, Blue’s mean perceived value is 28 points, whereas Not Blue’s mean
perceived value is just 13 points, i.e. just around half as much.36 In S4, the perceived
values of Blue and Not Blue are 32 and 18 respectively.37
Explaining discrimination Let DGivingRate (DReturnRate) be equal to mean giv-
ing (return) rate by a subject to same group status subjects minus mean giving (return)
rate by the same subject to different group status subjects. To investigate discrimina-
tion further, we ran regressions, controlling for session specific effects using error
clustering, on DGivingRate (Regressions 13–18) and DReturnRate (Regressions 19–
24).38 Tables 7 and 8 give the results of these regressions.
Regression 13 contains the same independent variables as the regressions in Ta-
ble 5. Regression 14 adds stage 2 M and Regression 15 adds interaction terms be-
tween stage 2 M and GroupOf8, Majority, Minority and NotBlue. Regressions 16–18
are the corresponding regressions adding the end of experiment task variables (and
working on the subset of sessions for which the end of experiment task data is avail-
able). Regressions 19–24 are the corresponding regressions to Regressions 13–18 but
with DReturnRate as the dependent variable and DGiving Rate as Second Mover as
an added independent variable (defined as the giving rate from insiders minus the
giving rate from outsiders which the subject has experienced as a trustee).39
Result 4 Subjects who value their group more give comparatively more to insid-
ers than to outsiders. Low status subjects discriminate less in giving rates between
insiders and outsiders, and, when covariates are controlled for, minority subjects dis-
criminate less in return rates against majority subjects.
Support The M dummy is positive and significant in all regressions which include
it (P < 0.02). Regressions 13–16 show that Not Blue subjects discriminate less by
about 8 %. This fits with Result 1 that being labeled as an outsider to the one group
depresses giving rates to other outsiders. We also just determined that NotBlue is a
negative predictor of perceived value (Result 3 and Tables 5 and 6). That being the
case, it is not surprising that NotBlue becomes statistically insignificant as perceived
value measures are introduced: its effect appears to operate through the impact it has
on perceived value, which, in turn and as in HHZ, predicts less discrimination in
36The contrast remains if M (RE) and M (AE), psychological values with rational and adaptive expec-
tations respectively, are used, and so does not appear to be explained by different group membership
profitability expectations. Table 4 also shows that the gap in perceived value persists throughout the exper-
iment. One implication of high perceived values is social inertia, in the sense that subjects tend to stay in
their group rather than switch: only 11.6 % of choices result in a group switching deal (between 8.9 % and
14.8 % depending on the treatment).
37As shown in regressions in online Appendix D, both parts of the result are robust to having mean
expectations-dependent M values (i.e., dependent on expectations of material gains) across the experi-
ment as dependent variable; the second part is however more robust than the first part, as it is replicated
also when expectations-dependent M values from stage 2 only are used as dependent variable.
38Random effects regressions are presented in online Appendices E and F.
39Online Appendices E and F consider a number of other regression specifications respectively for DGiv-
ingRate and DReturnRate, including the use of Mb, expectations-dependent M, and M variables based on
average evaluations across all stages rather than just stage 2.
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Table 7 Regressions on DGivingRate
Regression 13 Regression 14 Regression 15
β t p β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −0.066 −1.22 0.231 −0.065 −1.21 0.236 −0.042 −0.38 −0.198
Majority 0.053 1.03 0.311 0.045 0.87 0.392 0.053 −0.31 0.207
Minority −0.038 −0.96 0.347 −0.051 −1.27 0.213 −0.008 −0.88 −0.556
NotBlue −0.077 −2.56 0.016 −0.055 −1.66 0.107 −0.046 0.54 0.362
M 0.002 3.13 0.004 0.003 −1.83 0.017
M × GroupOf8 −0.001 1.29 0.220
M × Majority 0.000 0.13 0.100
M × Minority −0.002 1.64 0.546
M × NotBlue −0.001 −0.21 −0.132
Gender −0.040 −1.37 0.182 −0.046 −1.57 0.127 −0.046 −0.06 −0.014
EcMgt 0.028 0.93 0.361 0.033 1.14 0.265 0.029 0.32 −0.129
UK 0.028 0.87 0.392 0.020 0.65 0.523 0.021 0.26 −0.146
China 0.035 0.91 0.368 0.035 0.91 0.370 0.038 0.10 −0.046
Age −0.002 −1.17 0.253 −0.003 −1.59 0.123 −0.003 0.12 0.033
Constant 0.192 2.56 0.016 0.180 2.47 0.019 0.152 −0.17 0.014
n = 358, R2 = 0.037 n = 358, R2 = 0.060 n = 358, R2 = 0.065
Regression 16 Regression 17 Regression 18
β t p β t p β t p
GroupOf8 −0.028 −0.47 0.645 −0.023 −0.37 0.712 −0.009 −0.11 0.910
Majority 0.044 0.76 0.454 0.037 0.63 0.536 0.064 0.84 0.410
Minority −0.005 −0.11 0.912 −0.012 −0.29 0.777 0.035 0.66 0.516
NotBlue −0.079 −2.41 0.024 −0.058 −1.63 0.117 −0.049 −0.81 0.424
M 0.002 2.64 0.014 0.003 2.54 0.018
M × GroupOf8 0.000 −0.21 0.836
M × Majority −0.001 −0.90 0.377
M × Minority −0.002 −1.09 0.284
M × NotBlue −0.001 −0.53 0.599
Gender −0.033 −0.94 0.356 −0.039 −1.12 0.275 −0.040 −1.10 0.281
EcMgt 0.004 0.12 0.904 0.013 0.43 0.669 0.014 0.46 0.647
UK 0.025 0.67 0.509 0.019 0.52 0.611 0.024 0.65 0.524
China 0.041 0.92 0.366 0.037 0.87 0.391 0.040 0.93 0.360
Age −0.002 −0.63 0.532 −0.003 −0.88 0.385 −0.002 −0.73 0.473
Risk Aversion −0.001 −0.04 0.970 0.001 0.01 0.988 0.002 0.06 0.952
Loss Aversion 0.005 0.11 0.910 0.002 0.04 0.965 0.000 −0.01 0.992
Ambiguity
Aversion
0.007 0.16 0.875 0.003 0.07 0.944 0.001 0.02 0.987
EDE Sensitivity −0.003 −0.77 0.450 −0.003 −0.77 0.449 −0.003 −0.73 0.471
Constant 0.155 1.56 0.131 0.135 1.41 0.170 0.086 0.91 0.370
n = 294, R2 = 0.026 n = 294, R2 = 0.046 n = 294, R2 = 0.052
Notes: DGivingRate is equal to the mean giving rate by a subject to same group status subjects minus mean
giving rate by the same subject to different group status subjects. We employ error clustering to control for
session level effects
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Table 8 Regressions on DReturnRate
Regression 19 Regression 20 Regression 21
β t p β t p β t p
DGiving rate as
2nd mover
0.085 1.89 0.068 0.086 1.91 0.066 0.091 1.99 0.056
GroupOf8 −0.030 −0.82 0.418 −0.031 −0.85 0.401 −0.057 −0.80 0.432
Majority −0.031 −0.84 0.405 −0.024 −0.66 0.511 −0.074 −0.96 0.345
Minority −0.046 −1.21 0.238 −0.038 −1.04 0.305 −0.119 −2.24 0.033
NotBlue −0.006 −0.13 0.897 −0.022 −0.50 0.620 0.064 0.82 0.417
M −0.001 −1.81 0.080 −0.002 −2.18 0.037
M× GroupOf8 0.001 0.60 0.556
M× Majority 0.002 0.74 0.466
M× Minority 0.004 2.20 0.036
M× NotBlue −0.004 −1.64 0.111
Gender 0.004 0.12 0.904 0.007 0.25 0.807 0.015 0.54 0.595
EcMgt −0.010 −0.26 0.794 −0.014 −0.35 0.731 −0.016 −0.41 0.687
UK 0.064 2.75 0.010 0.070 2.91 0.007 0.070 2.84 0.008
China 0.046 1.09 0.283 0.047 1.10 0.280 0.044 1.03 0.309
Age 0.002 0.99 0.329 0.003 1.33 0.195 0.003 1.32 0.199
Constant 0.061 0.83 0.416 0.068 0.90 0.375 0.090 1.00 0.323
n = 355, R2 = 0.034 n = 355, R2 = 0.045 n = 355, R2 = 0.063
Regression 22 Regression 23 Regression 24
β t p β t p β t p
DGiving rate as
2nd mover
0.069 1.34 0.193 0.070 1.37 0.183 0.081 1.55 0.135
GroupOf8 −0.004 −0.09 0.930 −0.010 −0.20 0.845 −0.068 −0.74 0.468
Majority −0.034 −0.86 0.399 −0.027 −0.66 0.515 −0.110 −1.25 0.222
Minority −0.023 −0.45 0.655 −0.016 −0.33 0.743 −0.160 −2.48 0.021
NotBlue −0.012 −0.25 0.805 −0.031 −0.68 0.502 0.061 0.76 0.456
M −0.001 −1.81 0.083 −0.004 −5.38 0.000
M× GroupOf8 0.002 0.88 0.388
M× Majority 0.003 1.23 0.229
M× Minority 0.006 4.21 0.000
M× NotBlue −0.004 −1.57 0.129
Gender −0.020 −0.56 0.579 −0.015 −0.42 0.677 −0.002 −0.07 0.947
EcMgt −0.029 −0.66 0.517 −0.038 −0.85 0.406 −0.045 −1.04 0.307
UK 0.041 1.47 0.154 0.047 1.64 0.114 0.038 1.27 0.216
China 0.085 1.84 0.078 0.089 1.87 0.074 0.084 1.80 0.084
Age 0.001 0.34 0.734 0.001 0.66 0.518 0.001 0.36 0.725
Risk Aversion −0.056 −2.11 0.046 −0.057 −2.14 0.042 −0.055 −1.85 0.076
Loss Aversion 0.059 2.05 0.052 0.061 2.08 0.048 0.060 1.84 0.078
Ambiguity Aversion −0.054 −1.82 0.081 −0.057 −1.88 0.072 −0.057 −1.70 0.103
EDE Sensitivity −0.004 −0.65 0.523 −0.004 −0.62 0.540 −0.004 −0.72 0.480
Constant 0.083 0.91 0.370 0.100 1.11 0.278 0.195 1.88 0.073
n = 292, R2 = 0.039 n = 292, R2 = 0.052 n = 292, R2 = 0.082
Notes: DReturnRate is equal to the mean return rate by a subject to same group status subjects minus mean
return rate by the same subject to different group status subjects. We employ error clustering to control for
session level effects
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giving. The natural interpretation of this is that, because low status subjects dislike
being low status, they discriminate less in giving.
Regarding the last part of the result on minorities, it fits with Result 2 on minorities
returning more to majority subjects. When controlling for the M interaction terms,
there is evidence that minority subjects discriminate less (P < 0.05 in Regressions 21
and 24).40
Result 5 Subjects who value their group more return comparatively less to insiders
relatively to outsiders. Minority subjects who value their group more discriminate
more between insiders and outsiders.
Support Subjects who place more value on their own group discriminate less in re-
ciprocating trust rather than more (P < 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.01 in Regressions 19, 20,
23 and 24 respectively). Conversely, subjects placing more value in their minority
groups discriminate more (P < 0.05 in Regressions 21 and 24).41
Other results In all regressions in Tables 5 through 8, our measure of EDE Sensitiv-
ity is uncorrelated with behavior.42 To the extent that they are proxied by our measure
of EDE Sensitivity, experimenter demand effects do not explain perceived value or
discrimination in either giving or return rates.
There is some evidence from Regressions 22–24 that risk averse subjects appear
to discriminate less (P < 0.05 or 0.06), loss averse subjects may discriminate more
(P < 0.05 or 0.06) and ambiguity averse subjects may also discriminate more (P <
0.05 or 0.1);
4 Discussion
As suggested by social identity theory as applied to the understanding of intergroup
discrimination (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 2001), we find evidence of deference, in differ-
ent ways, from low status and from minority subjects. In the psychological research,
majorities and minorities can both display ingroup bias (Leonardelli and Brewer
2001), but our minority subjects discriminate less in return rates against majority
subjects when covariates are controlled for (Result 4); and this appears to be con-
nected to greater giving to majority members (Result 2). Our low status subjects are
deferential with respect to the amount of trust they put in high status subjects, in the
40The first part of Result 4 is robust to all the alternative specifications considered in online Appendix E.
The second part (on low group status subjects) is robust with expectations-dependent M unless interaction
terms with M and Holt and Laury (2002) variants variables are simultaneously included, and is robust
to all other specifications. The third part (on minority subjects) is robust across the different regression
specifications in online Appendix F.
41The first part of the result is robust across the different regression specifications in online Appendix F.
The second part is also robust, with the single exception of one regression where M averaged across all
stages is employed and Holt and Laury (2002) variant variables are not included.
42This result is robust across all regressions in online Appendices E and F.
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sense that they put less trust in other low status subjects (Result 1) and so engage in
less discrimination (Result 4).
Three obvious qualifiers to our findings apply. First, our group identity manipu-
lation is minimal, and, while this is a good first step to allow interpretability, it is
possible that stronger group manipulations may be required to obtain larger or dif-
ferent asymmetries in behavioral results; we know that in other settings the strength
of group manipulation does affect behavioral findings (e.g., Charness et al. 2007;
Chen and Chen 2010). Nevertheless, it is striking how we find our minimal group
status manipulation having an impact, and more so precisely because it is a mini-
mal manipulation. Second, we cannot rule out that stronger effects of relative group
size might follow from more unbalanced group manipulations. As noted in Foot-
notes 8 and 20, random matching was adopted to have the same probability to
play with any other subject in the laboratory whether the co-participant belongs
to the same or other group, and, as a by-product of random matching, we needed
sufficiently large minority groups to ensure that subjects played with both insid-
ers and outsiders and we maximized statistical power. However, more unbalanced
groups are an obvious direction for future research. Third, since random match-
ing was adopted, in the majority/minority treatments, minority group subjects are
more frequently matched with majority group members. One might argue that mi-
nority subjects are deferential because of interacting more frequently with the ma-
jority group more than the minority group. However, on the one hand, the random
matching ensured that the probability of re-matching with any given subject was
precisely the same and so this strategy cannot be justified on the grounds of ratio-
nal reputational effects; on the other hand, HHZ explicitly tested for the effect of
greater frequency of interaction with a ‘segregation’ treatment where subjects played
twice as frequently with insiders as with outsider, and did not find that the aggregate
level of discrimination changed as a result of differences in the frequency ofinterac-
tion.43
Another key finding of our experiment is that there is loss in psychological value
from being either a low status ‘outsider’ or a member of a minority group. Never-
theless, Table 4 shows that in-group favoritism and positive perceived value are still
present on average with low status subjects. This is a significant finding in the fol-
lowing sense. One potential criticism of our minimal status manipulation is that what
we are really inducing is the perception of not being in any group. However, based
on (say) the positive perceived value, it is clear that Not Blue subjects still perceive
themselves as a group (if a less desirable, low status group) as opposed to perceive
43Table 2 of HHZ makes the point clearly (and is corroborated by the regressions in Table 3 of HHZ).
A ‘frequentist’ interpretation would imply that there should be less discrimination in the baseline treatment
(the 66 treatment in our paper and C in HHZ) than in that with segregation. The reason is that in the
baseline there is higher frequency of interaction with outsiders, and a lower frequency with insiders, than
in the treatment with segregation. However, discrimination in the giving rate (i.e. giving rate towards
insiders minus giving rate towards outsiders) was equal to 0.161 in the baseline and 0.141 in the segregation
treatment; and discrimination in the return rate (i.e. return rate towards insiders minus return rate towards
outsiders) was equal to 0.08 and 0.052 in the baseline and segregation treatments respectively. While the
between-treatment differences are minimal (and obviously lacking significance), the point estimates are in
the wrong direction relative to what the ‘frequentist’ interpretation would predict.
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themselves as belonging to no group.44 There are also real world examples, such as
the traditional Japanese caste system discussed in the introduction, where being clas-
sified as outsiders to the high status group or groups is the defining feature of how
the low status group is identified.
It is also interesting to compare these results to those from the psychological re-
search, in relation to which the stylized finding is that, while not universally so,
low status groups tend to display outgroup favoritism as opposed to the usual in-
group bias (e.g., Hinkle and Brown 1990; Jost and Burgess 2000; Hewstone et al.
2002). It is clear that the psychological research is right to suggest that low sta-
tus group members value own group membership less, and are more deferential
to high group status subjects as a result. Our study also replicates the psycho-
logical finding that low status subjects get lower satisfaction from group mem-
bership than on high status subjects (e.g., Ellemers et al. 1988, 1992; Sachdev
and Bourhis 1987); so do minority subjects, with minorities generally being per-
ceived more negatively than majorities (Lücken and Simon 2005; Seyranian et al.
2008).
There is a connection between the results on behavior and those on psychological
value. Low status subjects appear to have low morale and this lower investment in
own group identity leads to a reduction in trust towards other low status subjects. In
relation to minority subjects, there is both low morale and a lower return rate towards
other ingroup members. To put this in the organizational context referred to in the
introduction, managers need to be aware of the potential unintended consequences
for trust, trustworthiness and morale of creating status-based group partitions in an
organization. There is the risk of causing low morale among low status—particularly
if minority—workers, and, while high status subjects are not affected by discrimina-
tion, the overall impact on trust and trustworthiness for the organization is unlikely
to be positive.
Because of overall negative discrimination, creating a polarized society in terms
of emphasizing domestic (high status and majority) workers versus foreign workers,
as it is common among a number for example of UK newspapers and politicians,
erodes trust and trustworthiness, hence potentially leading to a more conflict prone
society. If foreign workers indeed see themselves as low status, it may also reduce
trust of foreign workers in other foreign workers, while reducing the negative effects
in terms of trustworthiness with respect to domestic workers. The qualification on
the foreign workers seeing themselves as low status is an obvious one, and is espe-
cially interesting to consider in the case of long standing status based social systems,
such as the caste system in India or Japan. A common understanding of social sta-
tus, as clearly identified in a caste system, ensures that a high caste agent does not
suffer from the negative social capital implications of social group partitioning in the
same way as an outcast. Future research is clearly useful to link our stylized artificial
group experiment to a richer natural group setup, against which our work can act as
a benchmark.
44For example, in all 10 status differential sessions Not Blue perceived values were equal to 0 (sign test
P = 0.005 in relation to both M and Mb).
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One finding which is inconsistent with HHZ is that, in return rate regressions,
higher perceived own group value is associated with less discrimination (Result 5).
There is a countervailing effect for minority subjects (also as per Result 5) and Re-
gression 24 in Table 8 shows that the two effects basically cancel each other for
minority subjects. For subjects who are not in minorities, if our result were repli-
cated, one possible interpretation of this would be that more stringent expectations
of trust are associated with members of one’s own group, leading to lower return
rates for each given level of trust. Put it differently, insiders would feel more let
down by any given level of trust from insiders ‘like them’ (Bacharach et al. 2007;
Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007), and as a result they would feel less incline to
fulfill trust as a result. This could be seen as another side of what Bohnet et al.
(2008) label betrayal aversion: if I strongly identify with a group and my higher
expectations are not fulfilled, I am more likely to return less as a punishment. Obvi-
ously, however, future research needs to determine the extent to which these psy-
chological valuation results are robust, let alone whether our interpretations have
merit.
The fact that our results are robust to our experimenter demand effect instrument
is at least suggestive evidence that such effects are not a problem in our experiment,
or at least they are less of a problem than in most other experiments also given the
subtlety of the social statue cue involved. This may not be surprising, since, in a
different experiment on inter-group behavior, Turner (1975) reached a similar con-
clusion based on a detailed analysis of end of experiment subject reports showing
that subjects did not see an experimentally ‘appropriate’ way to behave, and those
that did, did not always conform to it.45 Nor is there reason to believe that having a
market for groups may change group salience and so discrimination behavior as a re-
sult of an experimenter demand effect, since, as noted in an earlier footnote, HHZ ran
a control treatment—closely mirroring our basic design—where there were groups
but no market for groups and found no resulting difference.
There is a potential parallelism between our findings on minority subjects and
our findings on low status subjects; in both cases, there is evidence of comparative
unhappiness with one’s own position and of deference towards (in the sense of less
discrimination against) outsiders, though the latter operates differently for the two
cases. It is too early to say whether, in a sense, subjects perceive being in a minority
as being of low status. The different way in which a stronger psychological valuation
operated with respect of minorities and status with respect to return rates would sug-
gests that, as warned by psychologists (e.g., Hewstone et al. 2002), the analogy can
only be drawn that far.
45Obviously, post-experiment debriefing has limitations (Zizzo 2010) and further research trying to con-
trol for the potential explanatory role of experimenter demand effects in affecting experimental research
on intergroup behavior would be useful. In this sense, with our minimal group status manipulation and
our EDE sensitivity measure, this paper is just a step towards doing so. One specific experimenter demand
effect that we tested, following advice by a reviewer, was one where labeling the non-group members as
‘outsiders’ may lead to greater discrimination against them; in additional regressions, however, interact-
ing a non-group members as ‘outsiders’ dummy with our EDE sensitivity dummy, we did not find this
interaction negative, let alone statistically significantly so.
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5 Conclusions
We have presented an experiment which employed trust games to look at the impact
of low group status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrim-
ination. While the expected finding of negative discrimination found in HHZ was
broadly supported, there are important ways in which group status and comparative
group size made a difference. Low status subjects had comparatively low morale by
being low status, as measured by own group valuation. They trusted less other low
status subjects, implying a comparative deference towards high status subjects. Mi-
nority subjects had comparatively low morale by being in a minority. They were less
trustworthy with respect to other minority subjects, implying a comparative deference
towards majority subjects.
Stronger group identity led to higher discrimination in trust but, surprisingly, to
being more unforgiving when it came to reciprocating trust. We conjecture that this
may be due to subjects with strong group identity being more likely to feel let down
by any lack of trust in them displayed by others in their group. Obviously, further re-
search is needed to verify the robustness of our results, both in general and in relation
to specific natural groups and sets of groups.
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